Security

Exhibits in touring exhibitions must be transported and kept in conditions that are at least as secure as those they normally enjoy. The venue must bear in mind that an exhibition can present criminals with the opportunity to steal one or more related works from one place, instead of attacking the different premises where they might normally be kept.

The risks that works are exposed to when touring can be criminal such as theft, robbery, criminal damage or the potential for fraud, ransom or blackmail. As well as the risk of damage caused by individuals or groups with a political belief, lobbyists seeking to gain publicity also pose threats. And the opportunity for accidental damage during transit through a road traffic accident, mishandling by inexperienced staff and the potential for water damage and environmental decay are all present. Recent examples of criminals stealing lead from roofs of homes, churches and other public buildings has gone unnoticed until inclement weather or snow cause water to penetrate through the roof down into the building fabric or onto objects.

Robust and regular checks of the perimeter of any building holding works help to detect and prevent such risks; these should all be part of a good security plan.

Risks remain but the threat, the realistic opportunity to carry out a crime, varies according to different factors:

• Public hours
• Office hours when closed to the public
• Night time when a building may be unoccupied

Some venues will state a 24-hour or night time security presence is the best option. From experience the risks exposed from contracted staff, duress on staff, complacency, lack of training and lack of management have all contributed to large scale losses of artwork in Europe in recent years.
The security and safety of objects is the responsibility of all employees, directors, trustees and volunteers.

During public hours one can expect to be greeted at a door to a venue exhibiting works. The welcome should be friendly and advisory recommending large bags be left outside the gallery.

Assistance should be given to less able people to ensure they can access and enjoy the exhibition.
Rules such as ‘No food and drink’ or ‘No photography’ must be firmly but politely enforced.

Inside the exhibition visitors should be dissuaded from touching objects and this can be achieved through the use of display cases, hood, barriers or alarm technology. All of these are inert and are only good if an attendant is present to ensure any breach or trigger is firmly reinforced.

When an exhibition is being installed and de-installed, risks are heightened and access to the building and specific space should be controlled by locked doors and a security/personnel presence checking authorisation levels for access before anyone is permitted entry.

Whatever balance is agreed between lender, organiser and venue, this security plan must apply to the whole period that the exhibits are on the premises, from the moment they are delivered to the moment that they are collected.

To provide a level of security which will be acceptable to most lenders, venues should adopt and implement a security policy, one which has been tried and tested over the years. The basic requirements are all contained in the Annex D to F of the Guidelines of the UK Government’s Indemnity Scheme for non-national institutions, found at: http://www.artscouncil.org.uk/protecting-cultural-objects/government-indemnity-scheme (link updated 2017)

This policy is the standard against which a venue’s suitability to receive loans from the national collections is measured or covered by the Government Indemnity Scheme. It is good practice to implement/require security to this standard whether your venue, or the venues you are touring to, qualify for Government Indemnity or not.

The security perimeter – roof, walls and floor plus any openings in them – of a venue must be capable of resisting a determined physical attack for at least the amount of time needed for the police or security staff to respond to the activation of an intruder detection system. Galleries situated away from outside walls and above ground level are harder to penetrate and thus are likely to be more secure. However, the perimeter must also include the floors, ceilings and walls where there are other occupants in the building below, above or alongside display or storage areas. Details of specifications for walls, wall and roof-space cladding, for solid-core doors and steel-lining of doors, and for internal grilles and bars on windows and for strengthening wooden shutters is important.

The following is simply a brief summary:
As a rule, walls should be of reinforced concrete at least 12 cm (4.5″) thick or cement mortar brickwork at least 23 cm (9″) thick. The roof should be of reinforced concrete or of slate or tiles laid to close-boarded timber. External walls and – where the weight can be accommodated – ceilings can be reinforced by fixing a cladding of 4.04 mm expanded metal grille sandwiched between two layers of 18 mm plywood. Fixing should be by coach-bolts at 15 cm (6″) centres. Internal walls, ceilings and floors may dispense with the layer of plywood facing the space being protected.

Most burglars use windows, doors and roof-lights to gain entry. Unwanted openings should be blocked up, with new brickwork tied to the surrounding wall. Steel plate and other materials can be used, provided fixing bolts are at right angles to the direction in which force might be applied. Normally, defenses will be fitted internally, so that the appropriate alarm technology can be attached. Self-coiling steel shutters, collapsible gates, fixed iron or steel bars and plywood shutters are devices in general use. Where appearance is important, internal secondary glazing should be used, bonded to steel frames that are bolted to the wall.

Many older buildings are fitted with internal wooden shutters to glazed doors and windows. These can be strengthened, preferably with 2mm sheet steel on the outer face, wrapped round all four edges of the leaf. The thickness of the steel will depend on the ability of the shutter to carry the extra weight. Additional (and heavier) hinges should be fixed to the masonry, and steel locking bars should also be fixed to the masonry with a padlock.

Doors not amenable to secondary barriers should be replaced, with steel door sets or wooden doors laminated or clad with 16 gauge steel sheet. The least acceptable external door is solid hardwood or hardcore quality that is a minimum of 44 mm (2″) thick. External doors should not have glazed panels. They should have three hinges to carry the additional weight, and should open outwards, i.e. toward the direction of any attack. Hinge bolts are essential in outward opening doors because of the vulnerability of the hinges. There should be at least one high security lock present. Where two locks are recommended, they should be spaced equally along the door edge. Multi-bolt systems, which shoot bolts on all four edges of a door, provide more resistance. The strength of the door frame and of its fixing to the wall must be equal to the strength of the door and its locks.

Electro-magnetic locks should always be supported by high security physical locks as in the case of power failure these might ordinarily default to unlocked or open!

The deterrent value of an intruder detection system depends on whether a thief can enter and escape before the police or other response arrives. The typical response time from the local police should be investigated and if too slow (typically 10 minutes or more), then further security reinforcements need to be installed by the venue.

The system must be designed to support the mechanical and structural defenses. It should signal an alarm to an alarm receiving centre as soon as an attack occurs and before intrusion is completed.

Two common descriptions are used to define intruder detection systems:

• “Perimeter protection” includes those devices activated by an attack on the security perimeter
• “Space protection” describes devices activated by the presence of an intruder within the perimeter

Venues require both, but perimeter protection is of primary importance.

The system should be constantly monitored, so that the loss of any capability for a signal to reach the alarm receiving centre – through tampering with the system or cutting the telephone lines – results in an alarm at that monitoring station. Dual path secure signalling is a requirement for all venues in the UK who wish to take loans from National Institutions or under grant of Government Indemnity. The National Security Adviser based within Arts Council England is a good initial point of contact if you are unsure on any aspect of this brief: nationalsecurityadviser@artscouncil.org.uk.

Fire is a great risk to any cultural heritage and any venue holding works should be fitted with an automatic fire detection system which, like the intruder alarm, is linked to an alarm receiving centre to automatically attract the response of the local fire service. Fire detection can be sensors which react to smoke or heat or a personal alarm button.

Care must be taken when thinking of fire suppressants which may automatically activate in the case of an alarm as water from sprinklers can be extremely damaging. Certain safeguards need to be present and again, professional advice should be sought.

Some thefts from museums and galleries occur during opening hours, so it is important to devote time and attention to providing a layout that enhances security. As far as possible – without prejudicing the display of individual items or important sequences or groupings – the layout of exhibitions should be designed to provide the maximum protection. When planning a layout, particular attention must be given to:

• Preserving sightlines, to give invigilators the best possible view.
• Avoiding hidden corners where a thief can work in seclusion.
• Securing displayed material, to prevent removal as much by determined thieves as by opportunist ones, e.g. paintings, drawings and similar objects should be secured to the walls by mirror plates and security screws (i.e. requiring a special screwdriver) or similar approved methods.
• Protecting high-value or vulnerable objects by battery-powered sensors which trigger an alarm when an object is disturbed or when entry is detected into cases or into room-settings.
• Avoiding placing objects which could be easily removed close to doors which give easy escape from the building.
• Providing high security display cases for objects that are small, attractive, fragile and/or valuable. If a case is robust enough to resist attack, this may compensate for limitations in another element of the security provision; basic standards refer to a minimum glass thickness of laminated glass of 11.3mm. This is a minimum and where these particular objects are to be held, glass with a greater resistance to attack using polycarbonate should be considered.
• Using barriers, ropes, plinths and even furniture to create a space between visitors and valuable or vulnerable exhibits: this space enables attendants to see quickly when a visitor gets too close to an exhibit. Electronic proximity alarms can be used to minimise risk from touching. These work best as a second line of defense behind ropes or barriers.

An exhibition must be supervised for the whole period that the public is admitted. The ideal is one person per room and the terms of a Government Indemnity may insist on this level of invigilation.
Invigilation may be by full-time, paid security attendants or by unpaid volunteers. All should be trained, and then briefed for each exhibition, preferably by the person responsible for the showing so that their interest in the exhibits is aroused. It is useful to have a diagram recording the layout of exhibits, to provide the discipline of active checks at the beginning and end of a shift, and to identify immediately any exhibit that may be missing. A set of photographs of the installation is also useful. If the venue is large, invigilators should be equipped with a radio and if possible a wireless personal attack button to summon assistance as appropriate.

During the exhibition, invigilators should have a daily routine of inspecting all exhibits and display cases to identify any signs of tampering. Some thefts are committed over a number of days, and routine checks will reveal evidence of tampering with adhesive between glass edges or removal of screws.

Invigilators develop habits of gravitating to a communal point to converse with each other. This might be acceptable for operational reasons but normally invigilators should remain in their patrol area until replaced or instructed to move on.

Closed circuit television is often provided and seen as a tool to replace invigilators. This view is incorrect. CCTV should, if present, complement and support staff in the safekeeping of objects and collections, protection of staff and the pro-active management of the venue.

The use of CCTV may need to be registered with the authorities and systems should not be purchased or installed before a thorough operational requirement is completed. This will inform where CCTV cameras may be best placed, what they will see, how clear the images are they produce, will the system present live time images on a monitor, record images, who will react to any unacceptable activity seen on the monitor? All of these should to be considered before this investment is made.

Other aspects will require back-up power supplies, lighting levels in spaces to be viewed and how long images will be retained after recording.

If you have developed an exhibition to tour, you will need to assess the suitability of security offered by your potential venues, based on the requirements and values of the objects you are lending. All security arrangements, including additional or special requirements, should be discussed in advance of signing a hire agreement, and stated clearly within the agreement. The UK Registrars Group (UKRG) publish a Security Supplement, which it is common and good practice to require potential venues to complete to gain a base understanding of their security arrangements. The form and other UKRG forms can be downloaded from their website: https://www.ukregistrarsgroup.org/resources/ukrg-docs/ (link updated 2017).

The information provided by a potential venue can help inform further discussion. There is also a UKRG Display Case Supplement that can be used to make assessment of any display cases that the venue will be providing for use in the exhibition. If you are planning to hire an exhibition, the organisation from which you are borrowing may ask you to complete these forms. They can be stored in a digital format and, if kept up to date, can be used each time you apply to hire an exhibition. If in doubt The National Security Adviser?s office at the Arts Council should be contacted and their advice sought: nationalsecurityadviser@artscouncil.org.uk

Fact sheets providing further detail on all these matters can be found at http://collectionstrust.org.uk/resource/security-advice-to-architects-and-planners/ (link updated 2017)

Copyright Arts Council England 2015

Author: William Brown (2015)